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MYRES S. MCDOUGAL
DISTINGUISHED LECTURE
Nuclear Weapons and the Law of Armed
Conflict*
L.C. GREEN**
It is a great honour for me to be asked to deliver this address which
has been established in the name of Myres McDougal. Like every individ-
ual working in international law, I have had encounters with Mac. Let me
give just one instance. In 1964, while I was Dean of Law at Singapore, we
held a conference on the teaching of international law and Mac was
among those present. I asked him if he would deliver a lecture to my class
and he agreed. The first thirty minutes or so were taken up with Mac
writing his peculiar vocabulary on the board followed by about forty min-
utes of lecture. This was followed by a heated debate between Mac and
me. As we left the building, Mac asked another visiting professor, who,
unlike me, was a former student of his, whether he thought that the lec-
ture had made an impact. Our colleague replied that he wasn't sure that
they understood what Mac was saying, but he was sure that these stu-
dents would never forget that Mac had had the audacity to quarrel with
their professor in public, something which is not normally done in the
East.
Mac has written on many subjects and is, of course, an ardent be-
liever in the rule of international law, and the contribution it can make to
world order. He is also cognizant of the views of international decision
makers. The cognizance of these views is essential in forecasting the ac-
ceptance and the possible legalizing of nuclear weapons and nuclear war-
fare. These views are becoming even more relevant since there is a grow-
ing awareness that fall-out and radiation are inherently dangerous to the
environment and perhaps to the very existence of mankind. Mac recog-
nizes this even though he has emphasised that nuclear weapons may be
* Based on addresses to the Ottawa Conference on Nuclear Weapons and The Law,
1987, and the McDougal lecture at the University of Denver College of Law, 1988.
** LL.B., LL.D., F.R.S.C., University Professor, Honorary Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Alberta.
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essential for the defence of the free world'. As he has pointed out:
From the perspective of realistic description, . . . international law
. . . is not a mere static body of rules but is rather a whole decision-
making process, a public order which includes structure of authorized
decision-makers as well as a whole international body of highly flexi-
ble, inherited prescriptions. It is, in other words, a process of continu-
ous interaction, of continuous demand and response, in which the de-
cision-makers of a particular nation-state unilaterally put forward
claims of the most diverse and conflicting character . . . , and in
which other decision-makers, external to the demanding state and in-
cluding both national and international officials, weigh and appraise
these competing claims in the terms of the interests of the world com-
munity and of the rival claimants, and ultimately accept or reject
them. As such a process, it is a living, growing law, grounded in the
practices and sanctioning expectations of nation-state officials, and
changing as their demands and expectations are changed by the exi-
gencies of new interests and technology and by other continually
evolving conditions in the world arena.2
Insofar as the 'Legal Bases for Securing the Integrity of the Earth-Space
Environment' are concerned, Mac has reminded us that:
. . .law is not some frozen set of pre-existing rules or arrangements
that inhibits constructive action about environmental and other
problems, but rather a dynamic and continuous process of authorita-
tive decision through which the members of a community clarify and
implement their common interests. . . . In recent decades, participa-
tion in world constitutive process, as in the embracing process of ef-
fective power, has been tremendously democratized-with not merely
nation-states but also international governmental organizations, polit-
ical parties, pressure groups, private associations, and individual
human beings playing important roles. . . . Similarly, a multiplying
host of private associations, operating within the larger constitutive
process, and increasingly international in membership, has similar
goals and areas of activity.3 Groups and individuals especially con-
cerned with environmental problems have abundant opportunity to
participate in all aspects of making and applying law. . . . [But if]
comprehensive planning, development, and controls are to be
achieved and made to secure the overriding goals of both maintaining
a secure environmental base and promoting and augmenting human
dignity values, many delicate and continuing adjustments will be re-
quired in the management of processes of authority and effective
power at all levels of government, from local through national and re-
gional to global. . . . The task of highest priority for all genuinely
committed to the goal values of human dignity is, of course, that of
creating in the peoples of the world the perspective necessary both to
1. McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea, 49
AM. J. INT'L L. 356, 356-357 (1955).
2. Id. at 356-357.
3. E.g., Greenpeace, Men of the Trees, Sierra Club; see Sierra Club v. Coleman, 421 F.
Supp. 63 (1976).
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their more realistic understanding of their common interests in rela-
tion to the environment and to their invention, acceptance, and initia-
tion of some of the many equivalent measures in constitutive
processes that might better secure such common interests.'
In addition to his concern for preserving the environment, Myres
McDougal is equally concerned for human rights. He maintains that the
respect for these rights constitutes jus cogens.5 It cannot be denied that
nuclear warfare would amount to the greatest threat to the fundamental
human right to life and yet, Mac recognizes the legality of such weapons
in self-defence. Moreover, while he points out that
[tihe destructive power of forces unleashed by the fission or fusion of
atomic nuclei. . . makes it difficult to characterize nuclear and ther-
monuclear bombs as 'just another weapon', [n]onetheless, the basic
policy issues involved in the use of those weapons in war are funda-
mentally the same issues raised by the other weapons or methods of
mass destruction, including, in particular, strategic target area bomb-
ing. In respect of the one as in respect of the other, it is difficult to
accept with much confidence absolute affirmation or blanket denials
of legitimacy, however creditable the motivations of the persons af-
firming or denying. No clear and unmistakable consensus is observa-
ble among commentators or governments on questions of lawfulness.
The continuing attempts, however, by various governments and
groups to 'outlaw' nuclear weapons tend to sustain the impression
that such weapons are regarded as permissible pending the achieve-
ment of agreement to the contrary. . . . [H]owever distressing it may
be,. . . processes of derivation and 'analogy' from conventional rules
and from inherited principles are hopelessly inadequate to sustain as-
sertions, in realistic expectation of probable future decision, of a com-
prehensive prohibition in international law of the use of nuclear weap-
ons. Such a prohibition so devoutly to be wished for by all who
cherish the values of human dignity, or perhaps even survival, must
require more effective implementation. Perhaps the only limitation
that can at present be projected with any plausibility is the ultimate
one, that is, the prohibitions of uses of these weapons for purposes of
terrorization, in effect the annihilation, of the general enemy popula-
tion. . . . [E]ffective control of and protection from nuclear weapons
can be hopefully sought . . . no[t] even in a new and unequivocal
agreement outlawing these weapons, but rather in the achievement of
a consensus . . . in the context of a comprehensive and continuing
sanctioning process, that sustains the principle of minimum order it-
self as well as a prohibition of nuclear weapons.6
This latter comment should caution us in our enthusiasm for agree-
4. Festschrift filr Wilhelm Wengler, 1 MULTITUDO LEGUM IUS UNUM, 261, 263-65, 270-
71, 288 (1973).
5. Address on Human Rights and World Public Order, INT'L L. A. CONF., Brussels
(1973).
6. M. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, 659, 667-68
(1961).
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ments on the limitation of specific types of nuclear weapons among the
various nuclear weapons. There is a tendency to acclaim any such agree-
ment as the great breakthrough and guarantee of future safety, overlook-
ing the fact that, despite the destruction of such weapons envisaged by
the particular agreement, the remaining stockpile is still sufficient to de-
stroy the world many times over. Given this fact and the realisation that
no country is prepared to see its own or the world's destruction, it is time
we turned our attention to the issue of nuclear weapons and the law of
armed conflict.
Any such analysis must begin with the 'Martens Clause' part of the
Preamble of the IVth Hague Convention of 1907.
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued [-and
this has not yet occurred-], the High Contracting Parties deem it
expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them [-and annexed to the Convention-], the inhabi-
tants and belligerents remain under the protection and the rule of
the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and
the dictates of the public conscience."
Article 22 of the Regulations expressly provided that "the right of
belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited." That
these humanitarian principles are still applicable is clear from what may
be regarded as the nearest we have to a supplementary code additional to
that of The Hague. In the Protocol I Addition to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August, 1949, relating to the Protection of Victims in International
Armed Conflicts, adopted in 1977, this preambular reference has been ele-
vated to the main body of the Protocol.' It is reproduced with merely a
slight verbal change, "as they result from the usages established among
civilized peoples" having become "derived from established custom." This
acknowledges development during the seventy years since The Hague. It
is now accepted that all independent nations are in fact 'civilized',' and
that the distinction between civilized and other peoples belongs to an
outdated colonial era. Article 35 of the Protocol is more restrictive in its
control of methods and means of warfare, providing as 'basic rules' that:
1. In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to
choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited. 2. It is prohib-
ited to employ weapons, projectiles and material methods of warfare
of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, and
Article 35 introduces a new concept which reflects the United Nations
Convention on the Prohibition of Military and Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques. 0 The Article states that:
7. D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 63-64 (1981).
8. Id. at 558, art. 1(2).
9. See, e.g., Walton v. Arab American Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541, 545 (2d. Cir. 1956), in
which the 2d Circuit Court refused to consider Saudi Arabia as 'uncivilized'.
10. D. SHINDLER & J. TOMAN, supra note 7, at 131.
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3. It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and se-
vere damage to the natural environment.
The importance of the references to the Protocol, even though it has
not yet been ratified by any major military power, lies in the fact that,
unlike Hague Convention IV, it is not restricted to land warfare. It should
be noted, however, that the Nuremberg Tribunal expressly stated" that
"by 1939 [the] rules laid down in the Convention were recognized by all
civilized nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and
customs of war." It is arguable that the general principles embodied in
the Hague Regulations, especially those relating to the treatment of non-
combatants, armistice and peace, based as they are on humanitarian prin-
ciples, are of general application regardless of the theatre of war. This
view is supported in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Protocol I of 1977.
It should be noted that a finding of "superfluous injury or unneces-
sary suffering," which was forbidden in Hague Regulations 23,12 is not
based on the subjective reaction of the person injured. It is foreseeable
that a victim would consider any injury suffered in conflict, by whatever
means, to be 'unnecessary or superfluous'. Support for this interpretation
may be seen in a 1962 publication of the United States Department of the
Army' 8 in its comment upon the ban on the use of poison in the Hague
Regulations.
14
It is in the area of poisonous rather that poisoned weapons that the
chief difficulty in applying the prohibition against poison is encoun-
tered. (a) The poisoned spear, arrow or bullet would be prohibited
because the spear, arrow, and bullet are or have been legitimate weap-
ons in their own right. The poison adds little to their effectiveness.
The suffering produced by the poison is unnecessary, the weapon it-
self having already placed the victim hors de combat. Also, the appli-
cation of poison to them converts them into a mere conveyance of the
poisoned substance. It is the poison and the unnecessary suffering, not
the bullet, which is condemned. (b) Such is not the case with such
modern weapons as toxic chemical agents and nuclear explosives.
Here the poison, if it can be called that, is either an after effect of the
use of the weapon or an essential part of the weapon itself. Prior to
the perfection of modern weapons the use of poison had been con-
demned because its use was both unnecessary and unsoldierly, it be-
ing administered almost always in a covert fashion. It was a maxim of
the Roman Senate that 'war was to be carried on with arms not with
poison'. Tiberius, in rejecting the use of poison states, '[i]t was the
practice of the Romans to take vengeance on their enemies by open
11. Judicial Decisions Int'l Military Tribunal (Nuremburg), Judgement and
Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 248-49 (1947).
12. ". . . it is especially forbidden... (e) To employ, arms, projectiles, or material
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering."
13. U.S. Dept. of the Army Pamphlet 27-161-2, 2 INT'L L. 40, 40-41 (1962).
14. REG. 23: ". . . it is especially prohibited (a) To employ poison or poisoned arms."
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force and not by treachery and secret machinations." These reasons
are not applicable to modern weapons. The 'poison' may be an arm
and it may be administered by open force. If so, then other considera-
tions may be more applicable in determining its legality or illegality.
Such other considerations bring into play the concept of proportion-
ality. A recent commentary on Protocol I explains that:
The prohibition concerning the infliction of superfluous injury or un-
necessary suffering is merely an implementing rule derived from the
basic principles . . . prohibiting those measures of military violence,
not otherwise prohibited by international law, which are not necessary
(relevant and proportionate) to the achievement of a definite military
advantage. The rule is therefore another way of stating the rule of
proportionality. . . . In this context the language. . . is more a reaf-
firmation than a development.16
This implies that since the purpose of war is to defeat the enemy and to
impose one's own will upon him, it is sufficient to disable his fighting
forces, without the concomitant of complete destruction of those forces.
Clausewitz recognized this to be so, even though he stated that since "war
is an act of force, there is no logical limit to the application of force." 7
This seems to be in line with his assertions that "[the] impos[ition of] our
will on the enemy is [the] object[ive of our using force]. To secure [this]
object[ive] we must render the enemy powerless. . . . The fighting forces
must be destroyed: that is they must be put in such condition that they
can no longer carry on the fight."' 8 However,
attached to force are certain self-imposed perceptible limitations...
known as international law and custom ... if civilized nations do not
put their prisoners to death or devastate cities or countries, it is be-
cause intelligence plays a larger part in their methods of warfare and
has taught them more effective ways of using force than the crude
expression of instinct.19
In fact, we may define the principle of proportionality as establishing:
a link between the concepts of military necessity and humanity. This
means that the commander is not allowed to cause damage ... which
is disproportionate to military need [-nor is he permitted to allow
those under his command to cause such damage]. It involves weighing
the interests arising from the success of the operation on the one
hand, against the possible harmful effects upon protected persons and
objects on the other [-thus it is enough to render combatants hors de
15. VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS OU PRINCIPES DE LA Loi NATURELLE, ch. VII at 155
(1758) [Carnegie tr. at 288 (gives the Tiberius reference as "that the Romans revenged
themselves upon their enemies by open force, and not by dishonorable methods and secret
plots,") (1916)].
16. BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 195 (1982).
17. C. CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 27 (Howard-Paret ed. 1984).
18. Id. at 90.
19. Id. at 76.
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combat without inflicting excessive injury or inevitable death]. That
is, there must be an acceptable relation between the legitimate de-
structive effect and undesirable collateral effects . . . . It is much eas-
ier to formulate the principle of proportionality in general terms than
it is to apply it to a particular set of circumstances, largely because
the comparison is often between unlike quantities and values. 20
In so far as specific weapons may have been banned the issue of pro-
portionality is irrelevant, for any use of such weapons would constitute a
breach of the law.2" If weapons, for example, booby traps,22 incendiaries,"
or gas,24 have been proscribed by treaty there is no problem. This is true
although a power which has neither ratified nor acceded to such a treaty
may well argue that it is not bound thereby, regardless of the number of
parties or the extent to which opino juris maintains that the proscription
amounts to customary law. This was the position with regard to the 1925
Geneva Gas Protocol which affirmed that "the use in war of asphyxiating,
poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices
has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world
. . . [and its] prohibition shall be universally accepted as part of Interna-
tional Law, binding alike the conscience and practice of nations . . ." In
1935 the United States Naval War College concluded that "the use of
poisonous gases and those that cause unnecessary suffering is in general
prohibited".2 However, as Charles Cheney Hyde has pointed out:
It is to be expected that a belligerent power will endeavor to make the
best possible use of a relative military advantage and to be contemp-
tuous of the dictates of humanity when they appear to frustrate a
means of attaining an early and decisive victory. It may be greatly
doubted, therefore, whether conventions purporting to restrict or reg-
ulate or prohibit recourse to particular forms of chemical warfare are
to be relied upon to prevent a belligerent from employing them
against the enemy when a relative advantage from so doing is suffi-
ciently clear.2
This statement concerns what course of action is likely if a belligerent
considers a treaty's restraint to be against its interests. The 1956 edition
of the United States Field Manual on the Law of Land Warfare was less
definitive:
20. Lt. Col. W. Fenreck, Paper given to officers attending Basic Law of Armed Conflict
course 8701 (Dept. of the Judge Advocate General, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa,
Apr. 1987).
21. See generally L.C. GREEN, Lawful and Unlawful Weapons and Activities, in Es-
SAYS ON THE MODERN LAW OF WAR (1984).
22. Convention on Prohibition or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Ef-
fects, Protocal 11, 19 I.L.M. 1523, 1529 (1981).
23. Id. at 1529.
24. D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, supra note 7, at 109.
25. C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW SrruATIONS 106 (1935).
26. 3 INT'L L. CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE U.S. 1823 (1947).
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The United States is not a party to any treaty, now in force, that
prohibits or restricts the use in warfare of toxic or non-toxic gases,
... or of bacteriological warfare . . . .The Geneva Protocol ...
signed. . on behalf of the United States and many other powers has
been ratified or adhered to by and is now effective between a consid-
erable number of States. However, the United States Senate has re-
frained from giving its advice and consent to the ratification of the
Protocol by the United States, and it is accordingly not binding on
this country."'
This situation was changed with the formal adherence by the United
States to the Protocol in 1975.28
The attitude of the United States prior to its adherence to the Proto-
col was in accordance with the accepted position in the international law
of treaties.2 This principle is seen in the decision of the World Court in
the S.S. Lotus case.
International law governs relations between independent States. The
rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own
free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted
as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the
relations between these co-existing independent communities or with
a view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the in-
dependence of States cannot therefore be presumed.3"
The general effect of the judgment is that states are free to do whatever
international law does not forbid them from doing. In the light of this
approach to the nature of international law and the discretion possessed
by states there evolved the doctrine pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt
which was applied in the Free Zones"3 case. The doctrine was restated
bluntly by Judge Read in his Separate Opinion on the International Sta-
tus of South-West Africa. "It is a principle of international law that the
parties to a multilateral treaty, regardless of their number or importance,
cannot prejudice the legal rights of other States. '3 This principle is
stated simpliciter in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties:
Article 34. General rule regarding third States
A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third
state without its consent."
In addition to weapons which are expressly banned by treaty, some
27. U.S. Dept of the Army, FM27-10, T 38.
28. See Presidential Statement of Jan. 22, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 299 (1975); Executive Or-
der 11850, 14 I.L.M. 794 (1975).
29. But see, Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Custom-
ary International Law, 56 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1985).
30. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 20, 35.
31. Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.), 2 HUDSON
WORLD COURT REPORTS 448 (P.C.I.J. 1932).
32. 1950 I.C.J. 128, 165.
33. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 8 I.L.M. 679, 693 (1969).
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means and methods of warfare are forbidden in accordance with custom-
ary law, although it must be recognized that such weapons have, for the
main part, fallen into desuetude and lost their usefulness in modern com-
bat. Thus, both the British and American Manuals of Military Law, for-
bid lances with barbed heads which would have been of value in hand-to-
hand combat by mounted knights in armour. The German War Book of'
1902, however, is more explicit. "The progress of modern invention has
made superfluous the express prohibition of certain old-fashioned but for-
merly legitimate instruments of war (chain shot, red-hot shot, pitch balls,
etc.), since other, more effective, have been substituted for these. '3 5
Prima facie, knowing what we now do of the effects of atomic or nu-
clear weapons, it would appear that these weapons fall within the prohibi-
tions concerning unnecessary suffering and proportionality. However, it
may be questioned whether the effects, especially long-term, of the
atomic bombs used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, were suffi-
ciently known to bring them within the prohibition. From the point of
view of the casualties, both personal and material, immediately affected,
there seems little ground for contending that such aerial attack was any
more illegal than the attacks against Rotterdam, Coventry, Dresden,
Bremen, Hamburg, Berlin or the 'fire-bomb' attacks against Tokyo. 6 As
to the long-term effects, many of which might not have been foreseeable
at the time, it is perhaps useful to refer to Administrative Decision No.
11,37 rendered by the United States-German Mixed Claims Commission.
The proximate cause of the loss must have been in legal contempla-
tion the act of Germany. The proximate result or consequence of that
act must have been the loss, damage or injury suffered .... Whether
the subjective nature of the loss was direct or indirect-is immaterial,
but the cause of [the injured party's] . . .suffering must have been
the act of Germany or its agents. This is but an application of the
familiar rule of proximate cause-a rule of general application both in
private and public law- . . . It matters not whether the loss be di-
rectly or indirectly sustained so long as there is a clear, unbroken con-
nection between Germany's act and the loss complained of. It matters
not how many links there may be in the chain of causation connecting
Germany's act with the loss sustained, provided there is no break in
the chain and the loss can be clearly, unmistakably, and definitely
traced, link by link, to Germany's act. But the law can not consider
... the 'causes of causes and their impulsion on one another'. Where
the loss is far removed in causal sequence from the act complained of,
it is not competent for this tribunal to seek to unravel a tangled net-
work of causes and of effects, or follow, through a baffling labyrinth of
confused thought, numerous disconnected and collateral chains, in or-
34. H.M.S.O., MANUAL OF MLITARY LAW, Part III, The Law of Land Warfare, 1 110
(1958); U.S. FM , supra note 27, at 34.
35. Morgan trans. 66, (1915).
36. See, e.g., J. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTs 273-75 (1947).
37. 7 U.N.R. INT'L ARB. AwARDs 23, 29-30 (1923) (italics in original).
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der to link Germany with a particular loss. All indirect losses are cov-
ered, provided only that in legal contemplation Germany's act was the
efficient and proximate cause from which they flowed.
In the War Risk Insurance Premium Claims" case the same Commission
stated:
The use of the term [indirect damages] to describe a particular class
of claims is inapt, inaccurate and ambiguous. The distinction sought
to be made between damages which are direct and those which are
indirect is frequently illusory and fanciful and should have no place in
international law. The legal concept of the term 'indirect' when ap-
plied to an act proximately causing a loss is quite distinct from that of
the term 'remote'. The distinction is important.
Some of this 'importance' may be seen if we refer to the claim made
in the Trail Smelters arbitration for damages in respect to the non-pro-
duction of timber allegedly resulting from the original tort.
With respect to damage due to the alleged lack of reproduction...
the Tribunal is of the opinion that it is not proved that fumigations
prevent trees from producing sufficient seeds, except in so far as the
parent-trees may be destroyed or deteriorated themselves .... [Tihe
loss of possible reproduction from seeds which might have been pro-
duced by trees destroyed by fumigation ... is too speculative a mat-
ter to justify any award of indemnity. . . . [Evidence shows] there is
a general lack of reproduction of both yellow pine and Douglas fir over
a fairly large area, and this is certainly due to some extent to fumiga-
tions. But . . . it is impossible to ascertain to what extent this lack of
reproduction is due to fumigations or to other causes such as fires oc-
curring repeatedly in the same areas or destruction by logging of the
cone-bearing trees . . . . It is further to be noted that the amount of
rainfall is [also] an important factor in the reproduction [of the trees
in question].
It is asserted that the atomic bombs contributed to the sterility of
some of their victims. Other factors, however, such as the inability of par-
ticular victims to find mates, as well as natural sterility, may have been
deciding factors. The size of a damages award depends upon the illegality
of the original act from which the damage is alleged to have followed.
Since there was in 1945 no clear :rule of customary law or treaty forbid-
ding resort to atomic weapons, the decision as to their legality depends
upon the basic rules regarding unnecessary suffering and proportionality.
Since the use of these two bombs was intended to bring the war in the
Far East to an earlier termination than might otherwise have been possi-
ble, and since it was feared that the resistance by the Japanese forces
would be sustained and determined, resulting in exceedingly heavy allied
casualties, it is arguable that the rule of proportionality was not infringed.
38. Id. at 44, 62-63.
39. 3 U.N.R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1905, 1929-30.
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It is also arguable that, even assuming the weapon is prima facie illegal,
recourse to it might be justified on the ground of reprisal. One must recall
the behavior of the Japanese in the invasion of China, specifically what
happened in Shanghai and Nanking, which was followed by the atrocities
in Hong Kong and Singapore. Then, when one considers the ill-treatment
of prisoners, under Japanese control, on the Siam-Burma railway and the
frightfulness of what happened in Manila, and the threat that this might
occur prior to every retreat by the Japanese, it becomes difficult to con-
tend that the effects of the atomic bombs were in any way disproportion-
ate, particularly since Japan's surrender followed so closely upon their
use. In this connection the comment by Lauterpacht is notable:
... it is difficult to express a clear view as to whether an explicit
prohibition of the use of atomic weapon in warfare would be merely
declaratory of existing principles of International Law. In any case, so
long as the production of the atomic bomb has not been prevented in
practice by international agreement and supervision, there must be
envisaged the possibility of its being resorted to in contingencies not
amounting to a breach of International Law. In the first instance, its
use must be regarded as permissible as a reprisal for its actual prior
use by the enemy or his allies. Secondly, recourse to the atomic
weapon may be justified against an enemy who violates rules of the
law of war on a scale so vast as to put himself altogether outside the
orbit of considerations of humanity and compassion. Thus if during
the Second World War it had become established beyond all reasona-
ble doubt that Germany was engaged in a systematic plan of putting
to death millions of civilians in occupied territory, the use of the
atomic bomb might have been justifiable as a deterrent instrument of
punishment .... Moreover, as laws are made not only for the protec-
tion of human life, but also for the preservation of ultimate values of
society, it is possible that should those values be imperilled by an ag-
gressor intent upon dominating the world the nations thus threatened
might consider themselves bound to assume the responsibility of exer-
cising the supreme right of self-preservation in a manner which, while
contrary to a specific prohibition of International Law, they alone
deem to be decisive for the ultimate vindication of the law of
nations."
Since international law reflects the views of what states regard as le-
gally binding upon them, it is essential that the laws of armed conflict
reflect military realities, and this of course in endemic in the concept of
proportionality. If the laws of war are too far from what military necessi-
ties demand, those rules will not be observed. In fact, as was clear from
the Geneva Conference on Humanitarian Law, 1974-77, most delegations
include military personnel to ensure that idealism does not run wild and
replace reality. The importance of paying attention to military require-
ments may be seen from the criticism levelled against Lieber's Code4 by
40. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 351 n.2 (7th Ed. 1952).
41. Instructions for the Govt. of Armies of the U.S. in the Field, Gen. Orders No. 100,
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Bordwell." Bordwell states that because the Code was "written by a non-
military man, it lacked the clearness which actual experience would have
afforded, and omitted much that might have occurred to one who had
seen responsible service in the field." The importance of military experi-
ence is clearly indicated in the Preface to the Oxford Manual published
by the institute of International Law in 1880. "The Institute. . . believes
it is fulfilling a duty in offering to the governments a Manual suitable as
the basis for national legislation in each State, and in accord with both
the progress of juridical science and the needs of civilized armies.' '14 In
light of this we should also look to the views of some of the leading nu-
clear powers to ascertain their appreciation of the law concerning atomic
or nuclear warfare. Since China and France, both nuclear powers, have
refused to become parties to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963"" it
may be presumed that they are unwilling to concede that nuclear weap-
ons are illegal. The Soviet Union has expressed its opposition to such
weapons in ideological terms. The Soviet Union is:
guided by the principles of socialist humanism [and] continues to
work for the international prohibition of barbarous means of waging
war. It is necessary especially to emphasise the outstanding part
played by the U.S.S.R. in the campaign for the prohibition of atomic
and thermonuclear weapons, which are weapons for the mass annihila-
tion of civilian populations. The impermissibility of the use of weap-
ons of mass destruction arises from a generally recognised principle of
International Law and expresses the legal awareness of all progres-
sive mankind .... The use of such weapons is also condemned by
some bourgeois writers, e.g., P. Guggenheim .... 45
Since Soviet endeavours to this end have been 'sabotaged' by the 'ob-
structionist tactics' of the United States and the United Kingdom, the
Soviet emphasis has reverted to what it was in the days of the League of
Nations, advocacy of complete disarmament. This includes:
the abolition of armed forces and armaments of all States, to end
arms production, abolish ministries of war, general staffs, and all
kinds of military and para-military establishments and organizations
and also stop the allocation of money for military purposes .... The
Soviet Government continues to strive for agreement on the cessation
of tests and the prohibition of atomic weapons, and on disarmament
as a whole, in which all the peoples of the world are interested."6
24 Apr. 1863, D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, supra note 7, at 3.
42. BORDWELL, THE LAW OF WA BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS 74 (1908).
43. D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, supra note 7, at 35-36 (italics added).
44. 480 U.N.T.S. 43, See, e.g. ROSSEAU, LE DROIT DES CONFLICTS ARMps 127 (1983): "il
n'existe aucune disposition juridique qui interdise d'une manifre g~n~rale la production, la
possession et l'emploi des armes nucl~aires, en dehors de l'interdiction des essais nucl6aires
A des fins militaires rsultant du traits de Moscou du 1963, auquel sont parties 105 Etats, A
l'exception de la France et de la Chine."
45. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE U.S.S.R., INSTITUTE OF STATE LAW, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 411-12 (1963) (italics added).
46. Id. at 414-15 (italics added).
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The United States Manual on the Law of Law Warfare states "[t]he
use of explosive 'atomic weapons', whether by air, sea, or land forces, can-
not as such be regarded as violative of international law in the absence of
any customary rule of international law or international convention re-
stricting their employment. 4 7 The British Manual is somewhat shorter,
and states:
There is no rule of international law dealing specifically with the law
of nuclear weapons. Their use, therefore, is governed by the general
principles laid down in ... paragraph 107, note 1. (In the absence of
any rule of international law dealing expressly with it, the use which
may be made of a particular weapon will be governed by the ordinary
rules and the question of the legality of its use in any individual case
will, therefore, involve merely the application of the recognized princi-
ples of international law, as to which see Oppenheim, vol. II, pp. 346-52) .41
The most complete military statement on the issue of nuclear weapons is
to be found in a 1962 publication of the United States Department of the
Army:
The provisions of international conventional and customary law that
may control the use of nuclear weapons are (1) Article 23(a) of the
Hague Regulations prohibiting poisons and poisoned weapons, (2) the
Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the use not only of poisonous
and other gases but also of 'analogous liquids, materials or devices', 49
(3) Articles 23(e) of the Hague Regulations which prohibits weapons
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering, and (4) the 1868 Declara-
tion of St. Petersburg which lists as contrary to humanity those weap-
ons which 'needlessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or
render their death inevitable'. 50
It has been asserted that even if these four provisions are applica-
ble to nuclear weapons they are inadequate to control them, without a
new specific prohibition." Article 35, FM27-10 [the Field Manual]
adopts the positon that 'explosive atomic weapons' are not violative of
international law in the absence of a rule restricting their
employment.
The unpublished annotation to paragraph 35 explains the reason
for the conclusion that such weapons are now (1956) lawful:
The weapon has already been used, it is still with us, and the major
powers are virtually committed in an operational sense to its use in a
future war .... The weapon has gained such acceptance that it is
spoken of in the context of disarmament rather than of illegality.
47. U.S. FM, supra note 27, at n.22, 135.
48. H.M.S.O., supra note 34, at n.29 111.
49. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, LEGALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 37-38 (1958) (author bases
the illegality of such weapons on that of gas, considering both a form of 'poison').
50. D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, supra note 7, at 95.
51. See, e.g., STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 344 (1954); Kunz,
The Chaotic State of the Laws of War, 45 Am. J. INT'L. L. 37 (1951).
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The qualifying word "explosive" is inserted to save taking a posi-
tion on the use of an atomic weapon, the effect of which was confined
to radiation [-such as the neutron bomb]. Such an arm might con-
ceivably run afoul of the prohibition of paragraph (a), Article 23, HR,
prohibiting the use of poison or poisoned weapons. This last para-
graph of the annotation is important because it underlines the fact
that the atom bomb has not one effect, but three effects. They are fire,
blast, and radiation. The weapon was used in World War II for its
blast effect, a use similar to all high explosives. However, it can con-
ceivably be used in a situation where only one of the three effects will
result, that of radiation. This could occur if the bomb were detonated
under water in a harbor. The port city would then be drenched with
radioactive water. Similarly a high altitude explosion would create
only a radiation hazard. It is this singular effect which the annotation
warns may run afoul of Article 23(a) HR on the use of poison. Because
the blast effect is similar to normal bombings, FM27-10 offers some
guidance in its adoption of the rule of proportionality in bombard-
ments: ". . . loss of life and damage to property must not be out of
proportion to the military advantage to be gained."
The norm of proportionality would apply equally well to the radiation
side effects of the blast. If the radiation is cumulative, then the con-
tinued use of nuclear weapons might tend to make such use dispro-
portionate despite the fact that the blast effects are confined to im-
portant military objectives.2
If, however, nuclear weapons of a type that may be used solely for tactical
purposes in the field are involved, some of the objections based upon the
indiscriminate character of the fall-out become irrelevant.
Since the military manuals of the kind discussed here are not legisla-
tive measures, they possess no greater binding authority than any other
commentary or legal textbook. This point is clearly made in the opening
paragraph of the United States Manual.
The purpose of this Manual is to provide authoritative guidance to
military personnel of the customary and treaty law applicable to the
conduct of warfare on land and to relationships between belligerents
and neutral States. . . . This Manual is an official publication of the
United States Army. However, those provisions of the Manual which
are neither statutes nor the text of treaties to which the United States
is a party should not be considered binding upon courts and tribunals
applying the law of war. However, such provisions are of evidentiary
value insofar as they bear upon questions of custom and practice
A similar exposition of the role of the British Manual is to be found in
Part I of that Manual, published in 1956. The true significance of such
Manuals may be seen in the comments of the United States military tri-
bunal in Re List (The Hostages Trial):53
52. U.S. FM, supra note 27, at n.8, 42-44.
53. 8 U.N.W.C.C., Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 34 (1948).
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The fact that the British and American armies may have adopted
[Oppenheim's views on the validity of superior orders as a defence to
a war crimes charge] for the regulation of their own armies as a mat-
ter of policy does not have the effect of enthroning it as a rule of
International Law. . . . Army regulations are not a competent source
of International Law. They are neither legislative nor judicial pro-
nouncements. They are not competent for any purpose in determining
whether a fundamental principle of justice has been accepted by civi-
lized nations generally. It is possible, however, that such regulations,
as they bear upon a question of custom and practice in the conduct of
war, might have evidentiary value, particularly if the applicable por-
tions have been put into general practice . . . . Determination,
whether a custom or practice exist, is a question of fact. Whether a
fundamental principle of justice has been accepted is a question of
judicial or legislative declaration. In determining the former, military
regulations may play an important rule but, in the latter, they do not
constitute an authoritative precedent.5
Since judicial decisions are not obliged to follow military manuals, it
is necessary to examine what judicial statements, concerning the legality
of atomic or nuclear weapons, have been made. Neither of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunals, Nuremberg nor Tokyo, established at the end
of World War II, dealt with the legality of aerial bombardment, nor with
the use of the atomic bomb. However, Judge Pal of India, who dissented
on all counts from the majority verdict at Tokyo, delivered a most scath-
ing condemnation of the use of this weapon which he compared with the
most 'atrocious' orders or policies of Wilhelm II during World War I.
In the Pacific war under our consideration, if there was anything ap-
proaching [the ruthlessness of the Kaiser], it is the decision coming
from the allied powers to use the ATOM BOMB. Future generations
will judge this dire decision. History will say whether any outburst of
popular sentiment against usage of such a new weapon is irrational
and only sentimental and whether it has become legitimate by such
indiscriminate slaughter to win the victory by breaking the will of the
whole nation to continue the fight. We need not stop here to consider
whether or not 'the atom bomb comes to force a more fundamental
searching of the legitimate means for the pursuit of military objec-
tives'. It would be sufficient for my present purpose to say that if any
indiscriminate destruction of civilian life and property is still illegiti-
mate in warfare, then, in the Pacific war, this decision to use the atom
bomb is the only near approach to the directives of the German Em-
peror during the first world war and of the Nazi leaders during the
second world war. Nothing like this could be traced to the credit of
the present accused. 5
More significant is the decision of the Tokyo District Court in
54. Id. at 51.
55. Pal, INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST-DISSENTING JUDG-
MENTr, 620-21 (1953).
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Shimoda v. Japan5" that the atomic bombing of both Hiroshima and Na-
gasaki was 'an illegal act'. The Court recognized, however, that the bomb
was a new weapon and that there was no prohibition directly on point.
Of course, it is right that the use of a new weapon is legal, as long as
international law does not prohibit it. However, the prohibition in this
case is understood to include not only the case where there is an ex-
press provision of direct prohibition but also the case where it is nec-
essarily regarded that the use of a new weapon is prohibited, from the
interpretation and analogical application of existing international laws
and regulations (international customary laws and treaties). Further,
we must understand that the prohibition includes also the case where,
in the light of principles of international law which are the basis of
the above-mentioned positive international laws and regulations, the
use of a new weapon is admitted to be contrary to the principles. For
there is no reason why the interpretation of international law must be
limited to grammatical interpretation, any more than in the interpre-
tation of national law.
There is also an argument that a new weapon is not an object of
regulation of international law at all, but such argument has not a
sufficient ground as mentioned above. It is right and proper that any
weapon contrary to the custom of civilized countries and to the princi-
ples of international law, should be prohibited even if there is no ex-
press provision in the laws and regulations. Only where there is no
provision in the statutory (international) law, and as long as a new
weapon is not contrary to the principles of international law, can the
new weapon be used as a legal means of hostility ....
In the past, although objections were made by various interests
against the appearance of a new weapon because international law was
not yet developed, . . . new weapons nevertheless came to be regarded
as legal with the later advancement of civilization and the develop-
ment of scientific techniques. This, however, is not always true ....
Therefore, we cannot regard a weapon as legal only because it is a new
weapon, and it is still right that a new weapon must be exposed to the
examination of positive international law.
• . .[T]here arises the question whether the act of atomic bomb-
ing is admitted by the laws and regulations respecting air raids, since
the act is an aerial bombardment as a hostile act by military plane.
No general treaty respecting air raids has been concluded. How-
ever, according to customary law recognized generally in international
law with regard to a hostile act, a defended city and an undefended
city are distinguished with regard to bombardment by land forces,
and a defended place and an undefended place are distinguished with
regard to bombardment by naval forces. Against the defended city
and place, indiscriminate bombardment is permitted, while in the case
of an undefended city and place bombardment is permitted only
against combatant and military installations (military objectives) and
bombardment is not permitted against non-combatants and non-mili-
56. 8 JAP. ANN. INT'L L. 1964 212 (1963).
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tary installations (non-military objectives). Any contrary bombard-
ment is necessarily regarded as an illegal act of hostility ....
With regard to air warfare, there are 'Draft Rules of Air War-
fare'17 . . . . In these provisions, stricter expressions are used than in
the case of bombardment by land and naval forces, but what they
mean is understood to be the same as the distinction between the de-
fended city (place) and the undefended city (place). The Draft Rules
of Air Warfare cannot directly be called positive law since they have
not yet become effective as a treaty. However, international jurists re-
gard the Draft Rules as authoritative with regard to air warfare 8
. . . . [T]he fundamental provisions of the Draft Rules are consist-
ently in conformity with international laws and regulations, and cus-
toms at that time. Therefore, we can safely say that the prohibition of
indiscriminate aerial bombardment on an undefended city and princi-
ple of military objective, which are provided for by the Draft Rules,
are international customary law, also from the point that they are in
common with the principle in land and sea warfare. Further, since the
distinction of land, sea, and air warfare is made by the place and pur-
pose of warfare, we think that there is also sufficient reason for exis-
tence of the argument that, regarding the aerial bombardment of a
city on land, the laws and regulations respecting land warfare analogi-
cally apply since the aerial bombardment is made on land . . .. Of
course, it is naturally anticipated that the aerial bombardment of a
military objective is attended with the destruction of non-military
objectives or casualty of non-combatants; and this is not illegal if it is
an inevitable result accompanying the aerial bombardment directed at
a non-military objective, and an aerial bombardment without distinc-
tion between military objectives and non-military objectives (the so-
called blind aerial bombardment) is not permitted. . . . The power of
injury and destruction of the atomic bomb is tremendous . . . . and
even such small scale atomic bombs as those dropped on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki discharge energy equivalent to a 20,000 ton TNT bomb
in the past. If an atomic bomb of such power and destruction once
explodes, it is clear that it brings almost the same result as complete
destruction of a middle-sized city, to say nothing of indiscrimination
of military objective and non-military objective. Therefore, the act of
atomic bombing on an undefended city, setting aside that on a de-
fended city, should be regarded in the same light as a blind aerial
bombardment; and it must be said to be a hostile act contrary to in-
ternational law of that day.
,. .Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not cities resisting a possible
occupation attempt by land forces at that time. Further, . . . both
cities did not come within purview of the defended city, since they
were not in the pressing danger of enemy's occupation, even if both
cities were defended with anti-aircraft guns, etc., against air raids
and had military installations. Also, . . . some 330,000 civilians in
57. D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, supra note 7, at 147.
58. J. SPAIGHT, supra note 36, at 42-3; see also GREEN, Aerial Considerations in the
Law of Armed Conflict, supra note 21 at n.21, ch. VII.
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Hiroshima and 270,000 in Nagasaki maintained homes there, even
though there were so-called military objectives such as armed forces,
military installations, and munitions factories in both cities.0 9
Therefore, since an aerial bombardment with an atomic bomb
brings the same result as a blind aerial bombardment from the tre-
mendous power of destruction, even if the aerial bombardment has
only a military objective as the target of its attack, it is proper to
understand that an aerial bombardment with an atomic bomb on both
cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was an illegal act of hostility as the
indiscriminate aerial attack on undefended cities ....
During World War II, aerial bombardment was once made on the
whole place where military objectives were concentrated, because -it
was impossible to confirm an independent military objective and at-
tack it where munitions factories and military installations were con-
centrated in comparatively narrow places, and where defensive instal-
lations against air raids were very strong and solid; and there is an
opinion regarding this as legal. Such aerial bombardment is called the
aerial bombardment of an objective zone, and we cannot say there is
no room for regarding it as legal, even if it passes the bounds of the
principle of military objective, since the proportion of the destruction
of non-military objective is small in comparison with the large mili-
tary interests and necessity. However, the legal principle of the aerial
bombardment of an objective zone cannot apply to the city of Hiro-
shima and the city of Nagasaki, since it is clear that both cities could
not be said to be places where such military objective concentrate.
[This statement appears to be somewhat inconsistent with previous
recognition of the presence of guns, armed forces, military installa-
tions and munitions factories.]
Besides, the atomic bombing on both cities . . . is regarded as
contrary to the principle of international law that the means which
give unnecessary pain in war and inhumane means are prohibited as
means of injuring the enemy . . . . [I]t goes without saying that such
an easy analogy that the atomic bomb is necessarily prohibited since
it has characteristics different from former weapons in the inhumanity
of its efficiency, is not admitted. . . . [H]owever great the inhumane
result of the use of a weapon may be, the use of the weapon is not
prohibited by international law, if it has a great military
efficiency. ...
The destructive power of the atomic bomb is tremendous, but it
is doubtful whether atomic bombing really had an appropriate mili-
tary effect at that time and whether it was necessary. It is a deeply
sorrowful reality that the atomic bombing of both cities. . . took the
lives of many civilians, and that among the survivors there are people
whose lives are still imperilled owing to the radial rays even today 18
years later. In this sense, it is not too much to say that the pain
brought by the atomic bombs is severer than that from poison and
poison-gas and we can say that the act of dropping such a cruel bomb
is contrary to the fundamental principle of the laws of war that un-
59. It is arguable whether these are statements of good law.
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necessary pain must not be given."
It is not surprising that the Japanese court examined the issue from
a somewhat subjective point of view. Many of the comments made could
be used to sustain an argument to the contrary. Moreover, much of the
reasoning is ex post facto, reflecting upon what had in fact occurred, and
construes the facts solely from the 'victim's' perspective. The judgment
does not prove that recourse to the atomic bombs at the end of the war,
and for reasons prevailing at the time, was in fact contrary to the law of
war as then understood.
When one considers Judge Pal's judgement, one is compelled to con-
clude that his general attitude to the charges levied and his comparison of
the bomb with the practices of the Nazis completely ignores the circum-
stances of its use or the true character of the crimes committed by the
accused. It is therefore disproportional. In fact, it is a little difficult to
appreciate the legal reasoning that leads a High Court judge to feel that a
crime-if indeed there was one-committed by the prosecutor constitutes
sufficient ground to acquit an accused charged with a series of serious
crimes. Moreover, bearing in mind the history of the Indian National
Army6 and India's struggle for independence still continuing at the time
of the trial, one is tempted to enquire whether Pal's attitude does not
reflect a certain amount of subjective racism.
To some extent it might be considered that the nuclear is a more
developed and sophisticated form of the atomic weapon. It may is also
arguable that the difference in potential between today's nuclear weapons
and the atomic bombs of 1945 is such that the latter might almost be
regarded as conventional weapons. Again, it must be recognized that,
whatever may have been the situation in 1945, we now are aware of the
various effects of nuclear explosions and our attitude to the legality of the
weapon must be effected by this knowledge. At the same time, we dare
not ignore the fact that, as with every other issue in international law, the
practice of states must be taken into consideration, particularly the prac-
tice of those states most capable of using nuclear devices. In the North
Sea Continental Shelf Case,"2 the World Court pointed out that for a
rule to develop, it required, "a very widespread and representative partic-
ipation . . . provided it included that of States whose interests were es-
pecially effected." In this connection it should be recalled that the 1907
Hague Conventions included an 'all-participation clause.' 8 Both the En-
glish Prize Court in The Mowe, 64 and the Judicial Committee in The
60. Shimoda, supra note 56, at 235-42 (italics added).
61. See Green, The Indian National Army Trials, 11 MOD. L. REV. 47 (1948).
62. 3 I.C.J. 42 (1969).
63. See, e.g., Convention IV, Art. 2: "The provisions in the Regulations .... as well as
in the present Convention, do not apply except between Contracting Powers, and then only
if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention."
64. P. 1 (1915).
1988
20 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y VOL. 17:1
Blonde,66 made it clear, however, that Convention VI relating to the Sta-
tus of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities66 , could not
be ignored even when one was dealing with belligerents, particularly non-
maritime powers, who had not acceded or ratified the Convention. For
the Judicial Committe in The Blonde this was not considered sufficient to
invalidate the application of Convention VI:
... are the 'belligerents', who are to be taken into account... , the
belligerents merely who detain or suffer detention, or are they all the
Powers who are simultaneously engaged in war . . . ? Is the adher-
ence of all the belligerents, however remote from each other or uncon-
nected with the ships and their detention, the consideration for the
attaching of the obligation of any one of them, or are the mutual
promises of the Powers concerned-that is, of the detainer and the
detained-a sufficient consideration to bind them both together? Mu-
tuality is of the essence of the Convention. Is that mutuality complete
if the detaining sovereign and the sovereign of the ships detained rat-
ify and abide by the Convention, or is it imperfect, so as to prevent
the application of the Convention, unless and until other Powers, in
no way concerned in the ships or their fortunes, but merely connected
with one or both of those sovereigns in the general war, have likewise
ratified and likewise abided by the Convention, whether or not they
have ships or harbours, and whether or not they make or suffer cap-
tures, or are ever directly affected by maritime war at all?
It is very hard to credit that the operation of an agreement, so
earnestly directed to the attainment of the highest practical ends in
war, should have been deliberately made to depend on the accidents
or the procrastinations of diplomatic procedure in time of peace, even
when no real relation existed between the condition and the conse-
quence, between the ratification of all the parties and the detention of
the ships of one of them.67
In view of this, it is irrelevant that the General Assembly, in 1961,
adopted a Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and
Thermo-Nuclear Weapons to the effect that:
(a) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is contrary to the
spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct
violation of the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons would exceed
even the scope of war and cause indiscriminate suffering and destruc-
tion to mankind and civilization and, as such is contrary to the rule of
international law and to the laws of humanity;
(c) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is a war directed
not against an enemy or enemies alone but also against mankind in
general, since the peoples of the world not involved in such a war will
65. 1 A.C. 313 (1922) [hereinafter The Blonde].
66. D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, supra note 7, at 703 (the 'all-participation clause' is
Art. 6).
67. The Blonde, supra note 65, at 324.
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be subjected to all the evils generated by the use of such weapons;68
(d) Any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is to be con-
sidered as violating the Charter 69 of the United Nations, as acting
contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against
mankind and civilization. .... 70
Only the Soviet Union, among the nuclear powers, voted in favour of this
Declaration, while China, France, South Africa and the United States op-
posed it, and Israel and Pakistan, believed to possess a nuclear potential,
abstained. It, therefore, becomes difficult to consider such a Declaration
to be in accord with State Practice or what the states effected believe to
be of legal relevance. While the voting technically satisfied the require-
ment of Article 18,71 it can not be said to represent either opinio gener-
alis or universalis, or even necessitatis, for it only received 55 affirmative
votes, with 20 against and 26 abstaining. Thus, there were only 9 more
supporting the Resolution than there were opposing it or refusing to take
a stance on it one way or the other. Even the 1972 Resolution 2 on the
Non-Use of Force in International Relations and Permanent Prohibition
of the Use of Nuclear Weapons which "solemly declares .. .the perma-
nent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons", was adopted by a mere
73 votes, with 4 opposed and 46 abstaining. Here, China and South Africa
voted against it, while the others named above abstained. This was proba-
bly because, in addition to condemning nuclear weapons, the Resolution
renounced "the use of force in all its forms and manifestations in interna-
tional relations," hardly a principle to which they could express their
opposition.
Other documents to which reference might be made include those of
the International Conference of the Red Cross held in Vienna in 1965 on
the Protection of Civilian Populations against the Dangers of Indiscrimi-
nate Warfare. It declared "that the general principles of the Law of War
apply to nuclear and similar weapons."' s Another is the 1969 Edinburgh
Resolution of the Institute of International Law on the Distinction be-
tween Military Objectives and Non-military Objectives in general and
particularly the Problems Associated with Weapons of Mass Destruc-
tion.7 4 These documents have become somewhat historical in character,
however, since they have been overrun by the Protocol adopted at Geneva
68. See, e.g., McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 6.
69. See Draft Articles Provisionally Accepted By The International Law Commission
On Other Topics, 18 I.L.M. 1568. (It is interesting that the International Law Commission
makes no mention of the use of nuclear weapons in its draft articles on state responsibility.).
70. D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, supra note 7, at 121 [G.A. Res. 1653(XVI)].
71. U.N. CHARTER art. 18, T 2: "Decisions of the General Assembly on important ques-
tions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These
questions shall include recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international
peace and security .. "
72. D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, supra note 7, at 129 (G.A. Res. 2936).
73. Id. at 195.
74. Id. at 201.
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in 1977 relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Con-
flicts (Protocol I).75
Before examining the position under Protocol I of 1977, it is neces-
sary to refer to the 1976 Convention of the Prohibition of Military or Any
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques 7 since it is
generally accepted that the discharge of nuclear weapons does in fact
have long-term deleterious effects upon the environment. Article 1 in gen-
eral terms states that "Each State Party to this Convention undertakes
not to engage in military or any other hostile use of environmental modi-
fication techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as
the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party. '77 It
is important to note that while the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom
and the United States are parties to this Convention, it has not been
signed or ratified by China, France, Israel, Pakistan or South Africa.
As to Protocol I, Article 55 transfers the provision from the Environ-
ment Convention into a principle of humanitarian law in armed conflict:
1. Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment
against widespread, long-term and severe damage. This protection in-
cludes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which are
intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural envi-
ronment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the popula-
tion. 2. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are
prohibited.7 8 Presumably, if the discharge of a nuclear weapon would only
cause temporary, localised damage to the environment it might not fall
within this ban.
The only direct reference in the Protocol to nuclear energy is to be
found in Article 56 which relates to the protection of works and installa-
tions containing dangerous forces, and has nothing to do with the use of
nuclear weapons as such.
1. Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams,
dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the
object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such
attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe
losses among the civilian population. Other military objectives located at
or in the vicinity of these works or installations shall not be made the
object of attack if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces
from the works or installations and consequent severe losses among the
civilian population.
2. The special protection against attack provided by paragraph 1 shall
cease: . . .(b) for a nuclear electrical generating station only if it provides
75. Id. at 132.
76. Id. at 131; see, e.g., McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 6, at 388-89.
77. D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, supra note 7, at 132.
78. Id. at 583.
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electric power in regular, significant and direct support of military opera-
tions and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such sup-
port . . .
It is clear that if an attack on such a nuclear installation would not effect
the civilian population it would not be forbidden, while the reservation
indicates that military necessity overrides humanitarian considerations
even in this matter. It should be noted that the United Kingdom, when
signing the Protocol, made a declaration regarding this provision to the
effect ". . . that military commanders and others responsible for plan-
ning, deciding upon or executing attacks necessarily have to reach deci-
sions on the basis of their assessment of the information from all sources
which is available to them at the relevant time,"8 thus giving them ex-
tensive discretion.
More significant from the point of view of the legality of nuclear
weapons in armed conflict are the provisions with regard to the law to be
applied in such a conflict, together with the provisions specially providing
for protection of the civilian population and civilian objects. As has al-
ready been indicated, the Martens Clause, with its reference to "estab-
lished custom, . . . principles of humanity and . . . the dictates of public
conscience,"" l has been embodied in Article 1, while Article 2 makes it
clear that when the Protocol refers to 'rules of international law applica-
ble in armed conflict' it "means the rules applicable in armed conflict set
forth in international agreements to which the Parties to the conflict are
Parties and the generally recognized principles and rules of international
law which are applicable in armed conflict." 2 In connection with the
problem of the legality of nuclear weapons and the protection of the civil-
ian population, Article 51 is most significant:
1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general
protection against dangers arising from military operations. To give effect
to this protection, the following rules, which are additional to other appli-
cable rules of international law, shall be observed in all circumstances.
2. The civilian population as such. . . shall not be the object of attack.
Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread ter-
ror among the civilian population are prohibited.
4. Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are:
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective
79. Id. at 583-84 (italics added).
80. Id. at 634-35, 1(d).
81. Id. at 558.
82. Id.
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(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot
be directed at a specific military objective; or
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of
which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol;
and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.
5. Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as
indiscriminate:
(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civil-
ian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated. 3
To prevent unnecessary civilian damage, Article 57, 2(a)(iii), requires
those who plan or decide upon an attack to "refrain from deciding to
launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civil-
ian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated." 8" Here again, the United Kingdom dec-
laration, already mentioned, goes further, in that it specifically asserts "in
relation to paragraph 5(b) of Article 51 and paragraph (2)(a)(iii) of Arti-
cle 57, that the military advantage anticipated from an attack is intended
to refer to the advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a
whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the attack."85 This
would suggest that the reasons given for recourse to the atomic bombs in
1945, namely early termination of hostilities without further excessive
loss of life, might be put forward to give effect to this declaration of un-
derstanding. It is also likely that, since the United Kingdom is a member
of NATO, the other members of the alliance would adopt a similar
approach.
Prima facie, it would appear that these provisions render the use of
nuclear weapons in armed conflict contrary to the new treaty law of war.
However, the Protocol was directed at the Reaffirmation and Develop-
ment of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, so that any provision
aimed at its development and not merely at its codification would only
apply, unless already established as a rule of customary law, to those par-
ties which ratify it. It is therefore important that, of the nuclear or alleg-
edly potential nuclear powers, neither Israel nor South Africa has signed
the Protocol, and only China, of the major nuclear powers, has acceded to
it. If the Protocol's provisions with regard to protection of the environ-
83. Id. at 581.
84. Id. at 584-85.
85. Id. at 635, (e).
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ment, long-term damage and the like are new developments, they are in-
significant from our point of view. If the provisions with regard to indis-
criminate attack, disproportionate casualties or unnecessary suffering are
merely declaratory of existing law, then the arguments presented earlier
with regard to the atomic weapon and its legality would equally apply.
More importantly, however, is that, in so far as the major powers are
concerned, it was never intended that the Protocol should deal in any way
with the nuclear weapon. In his Droit des Conflicts Armes Professor
Rousseau states:
Les armes nucl~aires ont t6 exclues du champ des d~bats de la Con-
frence qui a abouti A l'adoption des protocoles additionels de 1977 et
les trois grandes Puissances nucl~aires (Etats-Unis, Grande-Bretagne
et U.R.S.S.) ont confirm6 par des dclarations unilat~rales que les dis-
positions du protocole numbre 1 ne devaient pas ftre interprt~es
comme s'appliquant A l'emploi des armes nucl~aires.86
It is of interest to note that when the later conference on conventional
weapons was held,8 there was no suggestion that any attempt should be
made to proscribe the nuclear arm. Even before this, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had stated in connection with their
drafts, which became the subject of the humanitarian law conference and
ultimately the 1977 Protocols,88 that "[p]roblems relating to atomic, bac-
teriological and chemical warfare are subjects of international agreements
or negotiations by governments, and in submitting these draft Protocols
the ICRC does not intend to broach these problems . "..."89 As early as
the thirteenth session of the Conference the United Kingdom endorsed
this approach and
commented that it was on the assumption that the draft Protocols
would not affect those problems that the UK had worked and would
continue to work towards final agreement on the Protocols. The
United States expressed a similar understanding, expressing the view
that "such problems were beyond the scope of the Conference." The
Soviet Union also expressed its concurrence in the ICRC's
statement.90
The Protocol was ultimately adopted by consensus, at which time the
United States made a declaration of understanding:
From the outset of the Conference, it has been our understanding that
rules to be developed have been designed with a view to conventional
weapons. During the course of the conference we did not discuss the
use of nuclear weapons in warfare. We recognize that nuclear weapons
are the subject of separate negotiations and agreements, and further
86. RoUSSEAU, at 127 (1983).
87. See supra notes 22 & 23 and accompanying text.
88. Protocol II concerning non-international conflicts is irrelevant in this discussion.
89. BOTHE, supra note 16, at 188.
90. D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, supra note 7, at 551.
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that their use in warfare is governed by the present principles of in-
ternational law. It is the understanding of the United States that the
rules established by this Protocol were not intended to have any ef-
fect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.
We further believe that the problem of regulation of nuclear weapons
remains an urgent challenge to all nations which must be dealt with in
other forums and by other agreements.9'
Similar statements were made by France and the United Kingdom, and
no party to the conference, with the exception of a written statement sub-
mitted by India in the final Plenary, raised any objection to these under-
standings. It is clear that nothing in the Protocol, whatever its form or
implied content, can be taken to apply to nuclear weapons. This was reit-
erated by the United Kingdom and the United States when they signed
the Protocol. The former declared "that the new rules introduced by the
Protocol are not intended to have any effect on and do not regulate or
prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. '92 The United States declared that
"it is. . . [our] understanding. . . that the rules established by the pro-
tocol were not intended to have any effect on and do not regulate or
prohibit the use of nuclear weapons."93
In the light of the statements made by the three major powers and
France it is clear that if and when any of them ratify Protocol I, the party
ratifing will still be free of any restriction flowing from the Protocol as far
as the use of nuclear weapons is concerned. Although there is no treaty
banning nuclear weapons, and although the major nuclear powers have
reiterated their conviction that no black letter law exists proscribing their
use as such, it must be accepted that nuclear weapons, like any others,
are subject to the normal rules regarding proportionality,9 4 indiscriminate
damage, unnecessary suffering and the protection of civilians. Provided
these requirements, and particularly the rule on proportionality,95 are met
it would seem that in the eyes of the law of armed conflict, the nuclear
weapon is as much a legitimate weapon of war when properly used as is
any conventional weapon. As with any conventional weapon, improper
91. BOTHE, supra note 16, at 189 (italics added).
92. D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN, supra note 7, at 635, 11(i) (italics added).
93. Id. at 636 (italics added).
94. See, e.g., Mallison, The Laws of War and the Juridical Control of Weapons of
Mass Destruction in General and Limited Wars, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 333 (1967).
95. McDoUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 6, at 218:
. . .proportionality ... is but another application of the principle of economy
of coercion .... There is increasing recognition that the requirements of ne-
cessity and proportionality as ancillary prescriptions (in slightly lower-order
generalization) of the basic community policy prohibiting change by violence,
can ultimately be subjected only to that most comprehensive and fundamental
test of all law, reasonableness in particular context. What remains to be
stressed is that reasonableness in particular context does not mean arbitrari-
ness in decision but in fact its exact opposite, the disciplined ascription of pol-
icy import to varying factors in appraising their operational and functional sig-
nificance for community goals in given instances of coercion.
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use of the nuclear weapon would constitute a breach of the law and a war
crime amenable to trial by any authority still in existence and willing to
institute the necessary proceedings. However, there is probably little to
be gained in pursing the recent suggestion96 that it might be worthwhile
for
one of the political organs of the United Nations to ask the Court for
an Advisory Opinion on the present meaning of "civilised nations" in
Article 38(1)(c) of its Statute. The request might be formulated under
three heads:
(1) Can a nation which prepares, if only contingently, for use of means of
mechanised barbarism and co-extermination be considered as being
civilised?
(2) A fortiori, can this description be applied to any nation which, in any
circumstances, actually resorts to the use of such weapons?
(3) Would the Court subscribe to the view, expressed by Alberico Gentili
four centuries ago, on the unlawfulness of any weapons which are unac-
ceptable "because war, a contest between men, through these acts is made
a struggle of demons"?9"
This ignores the fact that the General Assembly is made up of state rep-
resentatives, and, while the nuclear powers may be in a minority, they
can be relied upon to ensure that they and their friends will constitute a
one-third blocking minority. Moreover, even those not yet possessing nu-
clear weapons, but hoping to do so in the future, are unlikely to agree to
ask for any Opinion which might label them even potentially 'uncivilized'.
96. 4 SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 732-33 (1986).
97. 2 DE JURE BELLI ch. VI, 1261 (1612) (Carnegie trans. 1933).
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